Current standard
What this RFC defines
RFC 8601 defines the Authentication-Results header field, which records the outcomes of email authentication checks performed by a receiving server. SPF, DKIM, and DMARC results are all written into this header after verification, and it is passed downstream for use by spam filters, BIMI processors, and other systems.
Where you see it in practice
When you view the full headers of an email in Gmail or Outlook and see Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@example.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=example.com; dmarc=pass, that block is an Authentication-Results header as defined by RFC 8601. BIMI uses this header to verify DMARC pass before displaying a sender’s logo. Anti-spam systems weight authenticated messages differently based on these recorded results.
The Authentication-Results header
RFC 8601 defines the Authentication-Results header field, which lets a receiving MTA record the outcomes of authentication checks it performed (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, ARC, reverse DNS, SMTP AUTH and others registered with IANA) so that downstream systems and users can see what was verified. The header syntax is Authentication-Results: mx.example.com; dkim=pass header.d=sender.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sender.com; dmarc=pass header.from=sender.com. Each result includes the mechanism name, the outcome, and identifying context.
Why it matters for debugging
When deliverability problems occur, the Authentication-Results header is usually the first place to look. If SPF fails, DKIM fails, or DMARC is not aligned, this header shows exactly why. Every major mailbox provider stamps inbound mail with Authentication-Results before delivery, and this header is preserved in the raw message source. Gmail, Outlook.com, Yahoo, and enterprise MTAs all follow the RFC 8601 syntax, though the specific mechanism identifiers vary slightly between providers.
RFC 8601 (May 2019) defines the Authentication-Results header: the standardized way for receiving MTAs to record authentication verdicts (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, and others) into the message headers so downstream systems and end users can see them. Every major receiver (Gmail, Outlook, Yahoo, iCloud) adds this header. Obsoletes RFC 7601. Parsing this header is the primary way to determine why a message was accepted, quarantined, or rejected.
RFC 8601 at a glance
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| Purpose | Record authentication verdicts (SPF/DKIM/DMARC/ARC/others) in message headers |
| Added by | Receiving MTA (typically the border MTA that performed authentication) |
| Multiple headers | One per authenticating MTA; ordered top-most = most recent |
| Result values | none, pass, fail, policy, neutral, temperror, permerror (per method) |
| Trust boundary | Must be stripped by receivers at edge; only trust internal-to-domain headers |
| Published | May 2019 (obsoletes RFC 7601) |
| Related | RFC 8617 ARC (chains Authentication-Results across intermediaries) |
Authentication-Results header anatomy
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com;
dkim=pass header.i=@sender.com header.s=mail-2026 header.b=aB3cD4;
spf=pass (google.com: domain of bounces@sender.com designates
192.0.2.10 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounces@sender.com;
dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=sender.com
Structure:
authserv-id Domain performing the check (mx.google.com)
; per method:
method=result [reason] [properties]
Methods:
spf, dkim, dmarc, arc, iprev, auth (SMTP AUTH), dnswl, x-*
Common authentication methods
| Method | What it verifies | Common result values | Key properties |
|---|---|---|---|
spf | MAIL FROM authorized by SPF record | pass, fail, softfail, neutral, none, temperror, permerror | smtp.mailfrom, smtp.helo |
dkim | DKIM signature verification | none, pass, fail, policy, neutral, temperror, permerror | header.d, header.i, header.s, header.b |
dmarc | DMARC policy evaluation | none, pass, fail, temperror, permerror | header.from (Gmail adds p=, sp=, dis= as a comment, not as registered properties) |
arc | ARC chain validation | none, pass, fail | smtp.remote-ip, header.oldest-pass (registered by RFC 8617) |
iprev | Reverse DNS (PTR) matches forward (FCrDNS) | pass, fail, temperror, permerror | policy.iprev |
auth | SMTP AUTH per RFC 4954 | none, pass, fail, temperror, permerror | smtp.auth, smtp.mailfrom |
bimi | BIMI record and evidence document (defined in the BIMI draft, not in RFC 8601) | pass, none, fail, temperror, declined, skipped | header.d, header.selector |
Result values and their meanings
| Result | Meaning |
|---|---|
none | No record found; no assertion possible |
pass | Verification succeeded |
fail | Verification failed (mismatch, invalid signature, unauthorized IP) |
policy | Policy rules caused the result (independent of cryptographic verification) |
neutral | Explicit no-assertion from the sender’s policy |
temperror | Temporary failure (DNS lookup timeout); should retry |
permerror | Permanent failure (syntax error, exceeded limits); investigate configuration |
Provider-specific fields: Gmail and Microsoft
RFC 8601 fixes the syntax, but each mailbox provider adds its own details. Two you will meet constantly:
| Provider | What it adds | How to read it |
|---|---|---|
| Gmail | A comment after the DMARC result, such as dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) | p and sp are the policies you published; dis is what Gmail actually did with the message |
| Microsoft (Outlook.com, Microsoft 365) | compauth=pass|softpass|fail|none and a three-digit reason code; DMARC can also read bestguesspass | compauth is Microsoft’s composite verdict on the From domain. Reason 000 means an explicit DMARC fail with p=quarantine or p=reject, 001 means the domain publishes no authentication records, 100 means SPF or DKIM passed and aligned |
To see the header: in Gmail, open the message, then the three-dot menu and Show original; in Outlook, open the message details or view the message source. Microsoft documents every compauth reason code in its anti-spam message headers reference.
A real case: the same email before and after DKIM alignment
Our own double opt-in emails, sent through Amazon SES, were landing in Gmail spam. The Authentication-Results header told the whole story. The values below are simplified (signatures and IPs removed), but the verdicts are the ones we saw.
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com;
dkim=pass header.i=@amazonses.com;
spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=…@eu-west-3.amazonses.com;
dmarc=fail (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=QUARANTINE) header.from=smtpedia.com
Everything “passed” except DMARC. DKIM passed for amazonses.com and SPF passed for an amazonses.com subdomain, but the visible From domain was smtpedia.com. With a strict DMARC policy (adkim=s, aspf=s), neither result aligned, so DMARC failed and Gmail applied our own quarantine policy: dis=QUARANTINE means the spam folder.
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com;
dkim=pass header.i=@smtpedia.com;
dkim=pass header.i=@amazonses.com;
spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=…@eu-west-3.amazonses.com;
dmarc=pass (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=smtpedia.com
The fix was three DKIM CNAME records in DNS. SES now signs with d=smtpedia.com, that signature aligns with the From domain, and DMARC passes even though SPF still points at Amazon. Once the records were verified, the confirmation emails reached the inbox.
How to read any Authentication-Results header in four steps
- Find the right header. Use the one whose authserv-id belongs to the receiving mailbox (mx.google.com for Gmail, a protection.outlook.com host for Microsoft). Ignore any copy the sender could have written.
- Read the dmarc result first. It is the verdict that drives inbox, spam or reject decisions at the big providers. If it says pass, the authentication side is fine and the problem is elsewhere (reputation, content, engagement).
- If DMARC failed, compare domains. Put header.from next to each header.d (DKIM) and smtp.mailfrom (SPF). DMARC needs at least one of them to pass and match the From domain. A pass on a different domain, as in our SES case, does not count.
- Check what the receiver did. In Gmail look at
dis=; in Microsoft look atcompauthand its reason code. That tells you whether the failure actually cost you the inbox.
From RFC 5451 to RFC 8601: the header’s history
| RFC | Published | What changed |
|---|---|---|
| RFC 5451 | April 2009 | Created the Authentication-Results header and its IANA registries |
| RFC 6577 | March 2012 | Fixed registry actions and added a Status field to the methods registry |
| RFC 7001 | September 2013 | Replaced RFC 5451 and added a Version field to the methods registry |
| RFC 7410 | December 2014 | Created the Email Authentication Property Types registry (smtp, header, body, policy) |
| RFC 7601 | August 2015 | Consolidated the registries and clarified the rules |
| RFC 8601 | May 2019 | Current version, Proposed Standard. No successor is in the RFC Editor queue today |
New methods do not need a new version of RFC 8601. They are added to the IANA Email Authentication Methods registry by the specification that defines them: arc by RFC 8617, dnswl by RFC 8904, and bimi by the BIMI draft. That is why a header can contain methods that RFC 8601 itself never mentions.
Trust boundaries and header stripping
Common Authentication-Results handling mistakes
dis= comment in Gmail’s DMARC results. Gmail writes both the verdict (pass/fail) and, in a comment, the disposition it applied (none/quarantine/reject). A DMARC fail with dis=none means the receiver observed the fail but did not act on it (perhaps because the sender’s policy is p=none). Reading only the verdict misses this operational detail.Related standards and further reading
- Authentication-Results Header Guide: parsing patterns and examples
- SPF Record Guide: understanding the SPF verdict
- DKIM Record Guide: understanding the DKIM verdict
- DMARC Record Guide: understanding the DMARC verdict and disposition
- Received Headers and Email Trace Chain: correlating Auth-Results with the delivery path
Frequently asked questions
Why do I see multiple Authentication-Results headers?
Each MTA that performs authentication adds its own header with its own authserv-id. A message routed through your provider’s edge, then your enterprise gateway, then your internal MTA will carry three Authentication-Results headers. Only trust headers from your own authenticated infrastructure (matching authserv-id); the others could be forged or represent intermediate verdicts before the message was modified.
Can I trust an Authentication-Results header from an external server?
No. Any sender can include an Authentication-Results header claiming any verdict they want. Only headers added by a trusted authenticator inside your trust boundary have meaning. This is why RFC 8601 mandates stripping pre-existing headers with your authserv-id at the trust boundary. If you accept mail across a trust boundary and want to preserve upstream verdicts, use ARC instead, which chains signatures cryptographically.
What is the difference between DMARC=pass and DMARC=none in the header?
pass means DMARC evaluation ran and the message aligned (SPF or DKIM aligned with From domain, and at least one passed). none means the sender has no DMARC record published, so no evaluation was possible. Treating none as equivalent to pass is a common mistake: a sender with no DMARC is unauthenticated territory and should be treated more skeptically than a sender with published DMARC and a passing verdict.
Where does BIMI show up in Authentication-Results?
BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) uses the bimi= method. A pass result means the domain has a valid BIMI record and logo, a passing DMARC verdict at an enforcing policy, and a mark certificate (VMC or CMC) where the receiver requires one, as Gmail does. Result values include pass, fail, none, temperror, declined (when receiver policy skips BIMI evaluation), and skipped. BIMI is not defined in RFC 8601 itself; the specification is in a separate draft that extends the RFC 8601 framework.
What is the dis= property in a DMARC result?
dis (short for “disposition”) reports the action the receiver actually took, distinct from the DMARC verdict. Values: none (no action taken), quarantine (delivered to spam), reject (bounced). A message can show dmarc=fail (p=REJECT dis=QUARANTINE) when the policy is p=reject but the receiver applied a local override and sent it to spam instead. DMARC lets receivers deviate from the published policy, typically for forwarded or mailing-list mail that fails alignment. The dis= comment is a Gmail convention, not part of RFC 8601.
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Alaa · LinkedIn
Email infrastructure specialist with 8+ years of hands-on experience in SMTP, deliverability, and email verification. I’ve configured and troubleshot mail systems across Postfix, Exchange, and cloud relays, managed IP reputation and warmup campaigns, and built verification pipelines processing millions of addresses. My work spans DNS authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, BIMI), bounce handling, blocklist monitoring, and compliance frameworks including CAN-SPAM and GDPR. I write every article on SMTPedia to give email professionals, developers, and marketers the accurate, RFC-grounded reference they need.
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