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RFC 8601: Message Header Field for Indicating Message Authentication Status

RFC 8601 Authentication-Results header explained: methods, result values, Gmail and Microsoft fields, a real DMARC fail fixed by DKIM alignment, and the header's history.

Alaa Touil
Email infrastructure specialist, 8+ years in SMTP and deliverability
11 min read Updated Nov 9, 2026 294 views
RFC 8601 Message Header Field for Indicating Message Authentication Status - SMTPedia reference
RFC 8601
Message Header Field for Indicating Message Authentication Status

Current standard

Domain
Authentication
Published
May 2019
Obsoletes
RFC 7601
SMTP relevance
High

↗ Read on rfc-editor.org

What this RFC defines

RFC 8601 defines the Authentication-Results header field, which records the outcomes of email authentication checks performed by a receiving server. SPF, DKIM, and DMARC results are all written into this header after verification, and it is passed downstream for use by spam filters, BIMI processors, and other systems.

Where you see it in practice

When you view the full headers of an email in Gmail or Outlook and see Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@example.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=example.com; dmarc=pass, that block is an Authentication-Results header as defined by RFC 8601. BIMI uses this header to verify DMARC pass before displaying a sender’s logo. Anti-spam systems weight authenticated messages differently based on these recorded results.

The Authentication-Results header

RFC 8601 defines the Authentication-Results header field, which lets a receiving MTA record the outcomes of authentication checks it performed (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, ARC, reverse DNS, SMTP AUTH and others registered with IANA) so that downstream systems and users can see what was verified. The header syntax is Authentication-Results: mx.example.com; dkim=pass header.d=sender.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sender.com; dmarc=pass header.from=sender.com. Each result includes the mechanism name, the outcome, and identifying context.

Why it matters for debugging

When deliverability problems occur, the Authentication-Results header is usually the first place to look. If SPF fails, DKIM fails, or DMARC is not aligned, this header shows exactly why. Every major mailbox provider stamps inbound mail with Authentication-Results before delivery, and this header is preserved in the raw message source. Gmail, Outlook.com, Yahoo, and enterprise MTAs all follow the RFC 8601 syntax, though the specific mechanism identifiers vary slightly between providers.

Quick Reference

RFC 8601 (May 2019) defines the Authentication-Results header: the standardized way for receiving MTAs to record authentication verdicts (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, and others) into the message headers so downstream systems and end users can see them. Every major receiver (Gmail, Outlook, Yahoo, iCloud) adds this header. Obsoletes RFC 7601. Parsing this header is the primary way to determine why a message was accepted, quarantined, or rejected.

RFC 8601 at a glance

AspectDetail
PurposeRecord authentication verdicts (SPF/DKIM/DMARC/ARC/others) in message headers
Added byReceiving MTA (typically the border MTA that performed authentication)
Multiple headersOne per authenticating MTA; ordered top-most = most recent
Result valuesnone, pass, fail, policy, neutral, temperror, permerror (per method)
Trust boundaryMust be stripped by receivers at edge; only trust internal-to-domain headers
PublishedMay 2019 (obsoletes RFC 7601)
RelatedRFC 8617 ARC (chains Authentication-Results across intermediaries)

Authentication-Results header anatomy

Real-world Authentication-Results from Gmail
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com;
dkim=pass header.i=@sender.com header.s=mail-2026 header.b=aB3cD4;
spf=pass (google.com: domain of bounces@sender.com designates
192.0.2.10 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounces@sender.com;
dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=sender.com

Structure:
authserv-id Domain performing the check (mx.google.com)
; per method:
method=result [reason] [properties]

Methods:
spf, dkim, dmarc, arc, iprev, auth (SMTP AUTH), dnswl, x-*

Common authentication methods

MethodWhat it verifiesCommon result valuesKey properties
spfMAIL FROM authorized by SPF recordpass, fail, softfail, neutral, none, temperror, permerrorsmtp.mailfrom, smtp.helo
dkimDKIM signature verificationnone, pass, fail, policy, neutral, temperror, permerrorheader.d, header.i, header.s, header.b
dmarcDMARC policy evaluationnone, pass, fail, temperror, permerrorheader.from (Gmail adds p=, sp=, dis= as a comment, not as registered properties)
arcARC chain validationnone, pass, failsmtp.remote-ip, header.oldest-pass (registered by RFC 8617)
iprevReverse DNS (PTR) matches forward (FCrDNS)pass, fail, temperror, permerrorpolicy.iprev
authSMTP AUTH per RFC 4954none, pass, fail, temperror, permerrorsmtp.auth, smtp.mailfrom
bimiBIMI record and evidence document (defined in the BIMI draft, not in RFC 8601)pass, none, fail, temperror, declined, skippedheader.d, header.selector

Result values and their meanings

ResultMeaning
noneNo record found; no assertion possible
passVerification succeeded
failVerification failed (mismatch, invalid signature, unauthorized IP)
policyPolicy rules caused the result (independent of cryptographic verification)
neutralExplicit no-assertion from the sender’s policy
temperrorTemporary failure (DNS lookup timeout); should retry
permerrorPermanent failure (syntax error, exceeded limits); investigate configuration

Provider-specific fields: Gmail and Microsoft

RFC 8601 fixes the syntax, but each mailbox provider adds its own details. Two you will meet constantly:

ProviderWhat it addsHow to read it
GmailA comment after the DMARC result, such as dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE)p and sp are the policies you published; dis is what Gmail actually did with the message
Microsoft (Outlook.com, Microsoft 365)compauth=pass|softpass|fail|none and a three-digit reason code; DMARC can also read bestguesspasscompauth is Microsoft’s composite verdict on the From domain. Reason 000 means an explicit DMARC fail with p=quarantine or p=reject, 001 means the domain publishes no authentication records, 100 means SPF or DKIM passed and aligned

To see the header: in Gmail, open the message, then the three-dot menu and Show original; in Outlook, open the message details or view the message source. Microsoft documents every compauth reason code in its anti-spam message headers reference.

A real case: the same email before and after DKIM alignment

Our own double opt-in emails, sent through Amazon SES, were landing in Gmail spam. The Authentication-Results header told the whole story. The values below are simplified (signatures and IPs removed), but the verdicts are the ones we saw.

Before: only the SES sending address was verified
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com;
dkim=pass header.i=@amazonses.com;
spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=…@eu-west-3.amazonses.com;
dmarc=fail (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=QUARANTINE) header.from=smtpedia.com

Everything “passed” except DMARC. DKIM passed for amazonses.com and SPF passed for an amazonses.com subdomain, but the visible From domain was smtpedia.com. With a strict DMARC policy (adkim=s, aspf=s), neither result aligned, so DMARC failed and Gmail applied our own quarantine policy: dis=QUARANTINE means the spam folder.

After: smtpedia.com verified as a domain identity with Easy DKIM
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com;
dkim=pass header.i=@smtpedia.com;
dkim=pass header.i=@amazonses.com;
spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=…@eu-west-3.amazonses.com;
dmarc=pass (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=smtpedia.com

The fix was three DKIM CNAME records in DNS. SES now signs with d=smtpedia.com, that signature aligns with the From domain, and DMARC passes even though SPF still points at Amazon. Once the records were verified, the confirmation emails reached the inbox.

How to read any Authentication-Results header in four steps

Checklist

  • Find the right header. Use the one whose authserv-id belongs to the receiving mailbox (mx.google.com for Gmail, a protection.outlook.com host for Microsoft). Ignore any copy the sender could have written.
  • Read the dmarc result first. It is the verdict that drives inbox, spam or reject decisions at the big providers. If it says pass, the authentication side is fine and the problem is elsewhere (reputation, content, engagement).
  • If DMARC failed, compare domains. Put header.from next to each header.d (DKIM) and smtp.mailfrom (SPF). DMARC needs at least one of them to pass and match the From domain. A pass on a different domain, as in our SES case, does not count.
  • Check what the receiver did. In Gmail look at dis=; in Microsoft look at compauth and its reason code. That tells you whether the failure actually cost you the inbox.

From RFC 5451 to RFC 8601: the header’s history

RFCPublishedWhat changed
RFC 5451April 2009Created the Authentication-Results header and its IANA registries
RFC 6577March 2012Fixed registry actions and added a Status field to the methods registry
RFC 7001September 2013Replaced RFC 5451 and added a Version field to the methods registry
RFC 7410December 2014Created the Email Authentication Property Types registry (smtp, header, body, policy)
RFC 7601August 2015Consolidated the registries and clarified the rules
RFC 8601May 2019Current version, Proposed Standard. No successor is in the RFC Editor queue today

New methods do not need a new version of RFC 8601. They are added to the IANA Email Authentication Methods registry by the specification that defines them: arc by RFC 8617, dnswl by RFC 8904, and bimi by the BIMI draft. That is why a header can contain methods that RFC 8601 itself never mentions.

Trust boundaries and header stripping

Untrusted Authentication-Results headers must be stripped at the boundary. An attacker sending mail can include a fake Authentication-Results header claiming any verdict they want. If downstream systems trust these headers indiscriminately, spoofing succeeds. Every receiving MTA at the boundary must strip pre-existing Authentication-Results headers with its own authserv-id before adding its own. RFC 8601 section 5 makes this a MUST. It is not automatic in every MTA: it is usually done by the authentication filter (milter) or a header-removal rule, so check that it is enabled on your border servers. If a header seems to contradict what your SPF, DKIM and DMARC setup should produce, header injection is worth investigating.

Common Authentication-Results handling mistakes

Reading the first Authentication-Results header without checking authserv-id. A message can carry multiple Authentication-Results headers from different intermediate MTAs. Only the header from your own trusted authenticator has value; headers with other authserv-id values could be forged. Always match on authserv-id.
Interpreting comment text as authoritative. Authentication-Results headers can include free-form comments in parentheses (like SPF’s descriptive text). Comments are for human diagnosis; do not parse them for policy decisions. Extract only the structured result values and properties.
Not distinguishing pass from none. A DMARC result of none means the sender has no DMARC record; a result of pass means DMARC was checked and succeeded. Treating them equivalently misses a critical signal: none means the domain is unauthenticated territory, pass means it is authenticated. See Authentication-Results Header guide for practical parsing.
Ignoring the dis= comment in Gmail’s DMARC results. Gmail writes both the verdict (pass/fail) and, in a comment, the disposition it applied (none/quarantine/reject). A DMARC fail with dis=none means the receiver observed the fail but did not act on it (perhaps because the sender’s policy is p=none). Reading only the verdict misses this operational detail.
Assuming Authentication-Results order is chronological. Per RFC 8601, top-most (first in the file) is the most recently added header. Bottom-most is the earliest. This is opposite the intuition many parsers apply; check the order convention of your parsing library.
Authentication ecosystem RFCs

SMTPedia companion guides

Frequently asked questions

Why do I see multiple Authentication-Results headers?

Each MTA that performs authentication adds its own header with its own authserv-id. A message routed through your provider’s edge, then your enterprise gateway, then your internal MTA will carry three Authentication-Results headers. Only trust headers from your own authenticated infrastructure (matching authserv-id); the others could be forged or represent intermediate verdicts before the message was modified.

Can I trust an Authentication-Results header from an external server?

No. Any sender can include an Authentication-Results header claiming any verdict they want. Only headers added by a trusted authenticator inside your trust boundary have meaning. This is why RFC 8601 mandates stripping pre-existing headers with your authserv-id at the trust boundary. If you accept mail across a trust boundary and want to preserve upstream verdicts, use ARC instead, which chains signatures cryptographically.

What is the difference between DMARC=pass and DMARC=none in the header?

pass means DMARC evaluation ran and the message aligned (SPF or DKIM aligned with From domain, and at least one passed). none means the sender has no DMARC record published, so no evaluation was possible. Treating none as equivalent to pass is a common mistake: a sender with no DMARC is unauthenticated territory and should be treated more skeptically than a sender with published DMARC and a passing verdict.

Where does BIMI show up in Authentication-Results?

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) uses the bimi= method. A pass result means the domain has a valid BIMI record and logo, a passing DMARC verdict at an enforcing policy, and a mark certificate (VMC or CMC) where the receiver requires one, as Gmail does. Result values include pass, fail, none, temperror, declined (when receiver policy skips BIMI evaluation), and skipped. BIMI is not defined in RFC 8601 itself; the specification is in a separate draft that extends the RFC 8601 framework.

What is the dis= property in a DMARC result?

dis (short for “disposition”) reports the action the receiver actually took, distinct from the DMARC verdict. Values: none (no action taken), quarantine (delivered to spam), reject (bounced). A message can show dmarc=fail (p=REJECT dis=QUARANTINE) when the policy is p=reject but the receiver applied a local override and sent it to spam instead. DMARC lets receivers deviate from the published policy, typically for forwarded or mailing-list mail that fails alignment. The dis= comment is a Gmail convention, not part of RFC 8601.

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About the Author

Alaa - SMTPedia author

Alaa · LinkedIn

Email infrastructure specialist with 8+ years of hands-on experience in SMTP, deliverability, and email verification. I’ve configured and troubleshot mail systems across Postfix, Exchange, and cloud relays, managed IP reputation and warmup campaigns, and built verification pipelines processing millions of addresses. My work spans DNS authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, BIMI), bounce handling, blocklist monitoring, and compliance frameworks including CAN-SPAM and GDPR. I write every article on SMTPedia to give email professionals, developers, and marketers the accurate, RFC-grounded reference they need.


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