Current standard
What this RFC defines
RFC 1847 defines two MIME multipart subtypes for message security: multipart/signed and multipart/encrypted. These provide the container format for email messages that carry a cryptographic signature or are encrypted, allowing the security layer to be applied to any MIME content type without restricting the content encoding.
Where you see it in practice
When you receive a digitally signed email from a corporate sender that your mail client shows with a certificate icon or verified sender badge, the outer message structure is a multipart/signed container as defined by RFC 1847. The structure contains the original message content as the first part and the detached signature as the second. S/MIME (today RFC 8551) and PGP/MIME (RFC 3156) both use the multipart/signed and multipart/encrypted types defined here.
Secure multipart formats
RFC 1847 defined two secure MIME multipart formats: multipart/signed (a body part plus its cryptographic signature as a second part) and multipart/encrypted (encryption control info plus the encrypted payload). Published in October 1995, this document is the structural foundation used by both S/MIME (RFC 5751 later, then RFC 8551) and PGP/MIME (RFC 3156). Most signed or encrypted email uses one of these structures; S/MIME encryption is the notable exception, as it uses a single application/pkcs7-mime part.
Multipart/signed structure
A multipart/signed message has three parameters in its Content-Type: protocol (the signature format, e.g., application/pgp-signature or application/pkcs7-signature), micalg (the hash algorithm used, e.g., sha256), and boundary (as with any multipart). The body has exactly two parts: the signed content (which is normal MIME) and the signature (which is opaque cryptographic data). Verifiers hash the signed content and check the signature against the expected key.
Practical deployment
Multipart/signed is preferred over inline signing because it lets clients that do not understand the signature format still display the signed content correctly. If a recipient without S/MIME or PGP support receives a multipart/signed message, they see the signed part rendered normally and the signature as an unfamiliar attachment they can ignore. This graceful degradation is why RFC 1847 multipart format won over embedded formats where the signature is intermixed with the content. Most signed email you receive follows the RFC 1847 layout; the main exception is S/MIME opaque signing (application/pkcs7-mime), described below.
RFC 1847 (October 1995) defines the Security Multiparts framework: two MIME content types (multipart/signed and multipart/encrypted) used by both S/MIME and PGP/OpenPGP to carry cryptographic protection. Separates the protected content from the cryptographic metadata (signature or encrypted key), letting mail clients without security awareness still display the content while security-aware clients verify or decrypt. Foundation for all modern signed and encrypted email.
RFC 1847 at a glance
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| Purpose | Define MIME structure for signed and encrypted email |
| Two types | multipart/signed and multipart/encrypted |
| Used by | S/MIME (RFC 5751, RFC 8551) and PGP/OpenPGP (RFC 9580, RFC 3156) |
| Key benefit | Content readable by non-security-aware clients; security verified by aware clients |
| Published | October 1995 |
multipart/signed structure
Content-Type: multipart/signed;
protocol=”application/pkcs7-signature”;
micalg=sha-256;
boundary=”—=signed-boundary”
—–=signed-boundary
Content-Type: text/plain
This is the readable body content. Non-security-aware clients
display this normally.
—–=signed-boundary
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name=”smime.p7s”
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=”smime.p7s”
MIIQ2AYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIQyTCCEMUC…
[base64 signature]
—–=signed-boundary–
Parameters:
protocol MIME type of the signature part
application/pkcs7-signature for S/MIME
application/pgp-signature for OpenPGP
micalg Message Integrity Check algorithm (SHA-256, SHA-384)
used for the signature
Structure rules:
– Exactly two parts: content first, signature second
– Content is exactly what was signed (byte-for-byte)
– Signature part contains the cryptographic signature over the content
– Any modification to content invalidates the signature
– Non-security-aware clients render only the content part
multipart/encrypted structure
Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
protocol=”application/pgp-encrypted”;
boundary=”—=encrypted-boundary”
—–=encrypted-boundary
Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
Version: 1
—–=encrypted-boundary
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
—–BEGIN PGP MESSAGE—–
hQEMA1kJ4Yn3D5j1AQf9GxKX…
[encrypted content]
—–END PGP MESSAGE—–
—–=encrypted-boundary–
Structure rules:
– Two parts: control info first, encrypted data second
– Control info identifies the encryption protocol
– Encrypted data contains the actual protected content
– Non-security-aware clients see only “encrypted message” indicators
– Aware clients decrypt with recipient’s private key
Note: S/MIME typically uses application/pkcs7-mime (single part, opaque)
rather than multipart/encrypted for encryption.
Why the multipart approach won
| Approach | Behavior with legacy clients | Behavior with security-aware clients |
|---|---|---|
| multipart/signed (RFC 1847) | Show readable body; ignore signature part | Verify signature over body |
| Opaque signing (single application/pkcs7-mime with signed-data) | Show “attachment cannot be displayed” | Extract body from signed envelope, verify, display |
What multipart/signed does not protect: the headers
RFC 1847 signs the content part only. The Subject, From, To and Date of the outer message sit outside the signature. An attacker who intercepts a signed message can change its Subject or swap the visible sender name, and many clients still show “signature valid”, because the signed body was not touched.
| Header | Covered by RFC 1847? | Covered by RFC 9788 header protection? |
|---|---|---|
| Body and attachments | Yes | Yes |
| Subject | No | Yes (and can be hidden when the message is encrypted) |
| From, To, Cc, Date | No | Yes |
| Received, DKIM-Signature and other headers added in transit | No | No (added after the sender signed) |
RFC 9788, published in 2025 as “Header Protection for Cryptographically Protected E-mail”, fixes this for both S/MIME and PGP/MIME. The sending client copies the header fields into the protected part, so the signature covers them, and the receiving client displays the protected values instead of the outer ones. It updates RFC 8551 and keeps the RFC 1847 structure, so legacy clients still display the message. Support in mail clients is still limited, so check whether yours renders protected headers before relying on them.
Common Security Multipart mistakes
sha-256, PGP/MIME uses pgp-sha256.Related standards and further reading
- RFC 5751: S/MIME 3.2
- RFC 8551: S/MIME 4.0 (current)
- RFC 9580: OpenPGP
- RFC 3156: MIME Security with OpenPGP
Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between multipart/signed and DKIM signing?
Different scope and purpose. multipart/signed (RFC 1847) signs the message body content end-to-end from sender to recipient; used by S/MIME and PGP. DKIM (RFC 6376) signs specified headers plus body hash for domain-level authentication; used for anti-spoofing at the sending domain level. multipart/signed proves who the person is and is checked by the reader’s client; DKIM proves which domain sent the message and is checked by receiving servers. They are complementary; a message can carry both.
Why does multipart/signed break in mailing lists?
Mailing lists modify messages: add [ListName] to Subject, add footers to body, add List-* headers. The signature covers exact content bytes; any modification invalidates it. Options: (1) list signs with its own key (replacing sender’s signature), (2) list preserves body exactly (rare), (3) the list leaves the body untouched and puts its information in List-* headers only. ARC does not help here: it records DKIM, SPF and DMARC verdicts for receiving servers, not the validity of an S/MIME or PGP signature, which the reader’s client checks on its own.
Should I use multipart/signed or opaque S/MIME signing?
multipart/signed for most cases. Non-security-aware clients see readable body; aware clients verify signature. Opaque signing hides body from unsupported clients, providing no fallback. Choose opaque only when you specifically need to prevent unsigned reading of the content (rare in email; more relevant for document workflows).
Can multipart/encrypted contain a multipart/signed inside?
Yes; this is the sign-then-encrypt pattern. Structure: multipart/encrypted with an inner multipart/signed, providing both signature and confidentiality. Decrypt first, then verify. Very common in secure email deployments. Alternative encrypt-then-sign (signed outside encrypted) is less common but useful for gateway signing over encrypted content.
Is RFC 1847 still current?
Yes. RFC 1847 has not been superseded; the multipart/signed and multipart/encrypted types it defines remain the foundation for signed and encrypted email in 2026. The specific security protocols using them (S/MIME, PGP) have evolved, but the multipart framework is stable. New implementations should target RFC 1847 for the multipart structure alongside their chosen security protocol.
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Alaa · LinkedIn
Email infrastructure specialist with 8+ years of hands-on experience in SMTP, deliverability, and email verification. I’ve configured and troubleshot mail systems across Postfix, Exchange, and cloud relays, managed IP reputation and warmup campaigns, and built verification pipelines processing millions of addresses. My work spans DNS authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, BIMI), bounce handling, blocklist monitoring, and compliance frameworks including CAN-SPAM and GDPR. I write every article on SMTPedia to give email professionals, developers, and marketers the accurate, RFC-grounded reference they need.
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