RFC 2595: Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP

Early TLS-for-email RFC. Obsoleted by RFC 8314 which mandates implicit TLS over the legacy STARTTLS approach.
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⚠ Obsoleted by RFC 8314. New implementations should reference the current version.
RFC 2595
Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP
Obsoleted
Domain
TLS / Security
Published
June 1999
Obsoleted by
RFC 8314
SMTP relevance
Historical
↗ Read on rfc-editor.org

What this RFC defined

RFC 2595 defined how to use TLS with IMAP, POP3, and ACAP protocols by adding a STARTTLS upgrade mechanism to each. It was the first specification for encrypting these email access protocols, preceding the modern approach that uses implicit TLS on dedicated secure ports (993 for IMAP, 995 for POP3).

Where you would have seen it in practice

RFC 2595 introduced the STLS command for POP3 and the STARTTLS capability for IMAP, allowing existing connections on ports 143 and 110 to upgrade to TLS before authentication. This was a significant security improvement over cleartext credentials. The STARTTLS approach it defined is still widely deployed in legacy configurations.

How it connects to other RFCs

RFC 2595 was obsoleted by RFC 8314, which mandates implicit TLS and deprecates the STARTTLS upgrade for client-to-server connections. It predates RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2) and RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3). The STLS and STARTTLS commands it defined remain present in deployed infrastructure but RFC 8314 is the current security requirement.

Current status

RFC 2595 was obsoleted by RFC 8314 in 2018. RFC 8314 deprecates the STARTTLS upgrade approach for client submission and access in favour of implicit TLS on dedicated secure ports. Legacy configurations using STARTTLS on ports 143 and 110 still follow RFC 2595 patterns, but new deployments should follow RFC 8314 and use ports 993 and 995.

STARTTLS for IMAP and POP3

RFC 2595 defined STARTTLS-style upgrades for IMAP, POP3, and ACAP in June 1999. The mechanism follows the same design as SMTP STARTTLS (RFC 3207): a client connects on the standard cleartext port (143 for IMAP, 110 for POP3), the server advertises STLS or STARTTLS capability, the client issues the upgrade command, and both sides negotiate TLS in place. This design allowed the same port to serve both cleartext and encrypted sessions during the transition period from insecure to secure defaults.

Superseded by RFC 8314

RFC 2595 was effectively superseded by RFC 8314 in January 2018. RFC 8314 declared cleartext mail submission and retrieval obsolete and recommended implicit TLS on dedicated ports (993 for IMAP, 995 for POP3) as the modern default. STARTTLS on the legacy cleartext ports still works, but new deployments should prefer implicit TLS to eliminate the downgrade window during which STARTTLS negotiation happens over plaintext.

The stripping attack

Like SMTP STARTTLS, IMAP and POP3 STARTTLS are vulnerable to stripping attacks where a network-level attacker removes the STLS capability from the server response, forcing the client to remain on cleartext. This is why RFC 8314 recommends implicit TLS: connecting to port 993 immediately negotiates TLS with no cleartext window at all. Clients that fall back gracefully from implicit TLS to STARTTLS on the legacy port defeat the purpose of implicit TLS; the client should refuse to connect if implicit TLS fails on the dedicated port.

Quick Reference

RFC 2595 (June 1999) defines Using TLS with IMAP, POP3, and ACAP: how these mail access protocols upgrade to TLS via the STARTTLS command, analogous to RFC 3207 for SMTP. Introduces the STARTTLS command for IMAP (port 143) and STLS for POP3 (port 110). Alternative to implicit TLS on the dedicated ports (993 for IMAP, 995 for POP3). Extended and hardened by RFC 8314, which recommends implicit TLS over STARTTLS for new deployments.

RFC 2595 at a glance

AspectDetail
PurposeUpgrade IMAP, POP3, and ACAP client-server sessions to TLS
IMAP commandSTARTTLS on port 143
POP3 commandSTLS on port 110
AdvertisementIMAP: STARTTLS in CAPABILITY; POP3: STLS in CAPA
AlternativeImplicit TLS: IMAP on 993, POP3 on 995 (started with TLS from first byte)
PublishedJune 1999
ModernizationRFC 8314 (2018) recommends implicit TLS for new deployments

STARTTLS across IMAP, POP3, and SMTP

ProtocolSTARTTLS commandCleartext portImplicit TLS portGoverning RFC
SMTP submissionSTARTTLS587 (and 25 for relay)465RFC 3207
IMAPSTARTTLS143993RFC 2595
POP3STLS110995RFC 2595

IMAP STARTTLS dialogue

IMAP with STARTTLS upgrade S: * OK [CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 STARTTLS LOGINDISABLED] mail.example.com ready C: A001 STARTTLS S: A001 OK Begin TLS negotiation now <<< TLS handshake >>> <<< All subsequent traffic encrypted >>> C: A002 CAPABILITY S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=PLAIN AUTH=LOGIN AUTH=CRAM-MD5 SASL-IR S: A002 OK Capability completed C: A003 LOGIN username secretPassword S: A003 OK Logged in C: A004 SELECT INBOX …Notes: – Pre-TLS CAPABILITY advertises LOGINDISABLED (login disabled until TLS enables encryption) – Post-TLS CAPABILITY typically differs from pre-TLS – Client must re-fetch capabilities after STARTTLS

POP3 STLS dialogue

POP3 with STLS upgrade S: +OK POP3 server ready C: CAPA S: +OK Capability list follows S: TOP S: USER S: STLS S: SASL LOGIN PLAIN CRAM-MD5 S: . C: STLS S: +OK Begin TLS negotiation <<< TLS handshake >>> C: CAPA S: +OK Capability list follows S: TOP S: USER S: SASL LOGIN PLAIN CRAM-MD5 S: . C: USER alice S: +OK C: PASS secretPassword S: +OK Logged in …

Common IMAP/POP3 TLS mistakes

Advertising authentication mechanisms before STARTTLS. Some servers list AUTH=PLAIN and AUTH=LOGIN in the pre-TLS CAPABILITY response, letting naive clients transmit credentials in cleartext. Fix: advertise LOGINDISABLED before STARTTLS and only expose AUTH mechanisms after TLS is active. Dovecot: disable_plaintext_auth = yes.
Not re-fetching capabilities after STARTTLS. The server’s advertised capabilities can (and typically do) differ post-TLS. Clients that skip re-CAPABILITY may miss newly available AUTH mechanisms or extensions. Always issue CAPABILITY (IMAP) or CAPA (POP3) immediately after successful STARTTLS.
Accepting invalid TLS certificates silently. A MITM with any certificate defeats TLS if the client accepts without validation. Modern clients must validate the server certificate against the connected hostname and a trusted CA. Users may override with warnings, but silent acceptance is a serious security bug.
Falling back to cleartext after STARTTLS handshake failure. Some legacy client libraries fall back to cleartext IMAP or POP3 if TLS handshake fails. This preserves connectivity but destroys confidentiality; any observer sees credentials and mail. Modern clients per RFC 8314 should refuse to fall back and instead report the failure to the user.
Serving cleartext-only. Servers offering IMAP on 143 without STARTTLS capability, or POP3 on 110 without STLS, force clients to negotiate cleartext. Modern deployments should offer both encrypted ports (993, 995) and STARTTLS-capable versions of the cleartext ports (143, 110) so clients can pick per RFC 8314 guidance.
TLS ecosystem RFCs
  • RFC 3207: STARTTLS for SMTP
  • RFC 8314: Cleartext obsolete for submission and access
  • RFC 8446: TLS 1.3 (current TLS version)
  • RFC 5246: TLS 1.2
Mail access protocol RFCs
  • RFC 3501: IMAP4rev1 (current IMAP)
  • RFC 9051: IMAP4rev2 (2021 update, incremental adoption)
  • RFC 1939: POP3
  • RFC 4954: SMTP AUTH (analogous pattern for SMTP)
SMTPedia companion guides

Frequently asked questions

Should I use STARTTLS on port 143/110 or implicit TLS on port 993/995?

Per RFC 8314, prefer implicit TLS (993 for IMAP, 995 for POP3) for new deployments. Reasons: eliminates the pre-upgrade cleartext window that STARTTLS on 143/110 has, simpler client logic (no capability negotiation dance), and no fallback path for downgrade attacks. Servers should offer both to maintain compatibility with existing clients. Modern email clients default to implicit TLS.

Why does POP3 use STLS instead of STARTTLS?

POP3 commands are typically 4-character uppercase (USER, PASS, RETR, DELE). STLS follows this pattern; STARTTLS would be an outlier. Functionally, STLS in POP3 is analogous to STARTTLS in IMAP and SMTP: upgrade an authenticated session to TLS. Same semantics, different command name.

What is LOGINDISABLED in IMAP CAPABILITY?

An advertisement telling clients “the LOGIN command is disabled at this security level.” Servers typically advertise LOGINDISABLED before STARTTLS to prevent clients from sending credentials over cleartext. After successful STARTTLS, subsequent CAPABILITY responses omit LOGINDISABLED and offer LOGIN and various AUTH mechanisms. Clients should check for LOGINDISABLED and refuse to attempt authentication when it is present.

Are IMAP and POP3 STARTTLS still relevant in 2026?

Widely deployed but less recommended for new setups. Per RFC 8314, implicit TLS on dedicated ports is preferred. However, port 143 with STARTTLS and port 110 with STLS remain functional and common in legacy configurations. Modern servers should offer both approaches; modern clients default to implicit TLS on 993/995.

Can I use TLS 1.3 with IMAP and POP3?

Yes. RFC 2595 predates TLS 1.3 but the STARTTLS mechanism is version-agnostic; the negotiated TLS version depends on what both client and server support. Modern servers (Dovecot, Cyrus) support TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446) with appropriate cipher suites. Modern clients negotiate 1.3 when both sides support it, falling back to 1.2. Disable TLS 1.0 and 1.1 per RFC 8996 deprecation.


About the Author

Alaa - SMTPedia author

Alaa · LinkedIn

Email infrastructure specialist with 8+ years of hands-on experience in SMTP, deliverability, and email verification. I’ve configured and troubleshot mail systems across Postfix, Exchange, and cloud relays, managed IP reputation and warmup campaigns, and built verification pipelines processing millions of addresses. My work spans DNS authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, BIMI), bounce handling, blocklist monitoring, and compliance frameworks including CAN-SPAM and GDPR. I write every article on SMTPedia to give email professionals, developers, and marketers the accurate, RFC-grounded reference they need.


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